Should Trees Have Standing?
Christopher Stone's monologue, Should Trees Have Standing?, offers a compelling critique of the anthropocentric framework that underpins much of contemporary legal thought. Expanding on his groundbreaking 1972 essay of the same name, Stone’s 2010 work serves as a critical text for scholars examining the intersection of law, environmental ethics, and the ecological crises of our times.
Stone’s central argument is rooted in the concept of legal personality - the idea that certain entities are recognised by the legal system as having rights, agency, and standing to sue. Historically, these privileges have been confined to humans and, later, to legal constructs like corporations. Stone contends that this exclusionary framework reflects and reinforces power structures that treat nature as mere property rather than as a rights-bearing entity. For environmental law, an emergent discipline in the 20th century that initially prioritised nature’s economic value, this anthropocentrism is particularly problematic. The ecological challenges of today demand a rethinking of how law conceptualises and interacts with the natural world, and Stone’s thesis seeks to provide a blueprint for such a shift.
The Evolution of Legal Rights
Stone begins by tracing the historical expansion of rights, highlighting how once-marginalised groups such as women and enslaved people gained legal recognition over time, often as societies’ moral and social consciousness evolved. By analogy, he argues that extending rights to nonhuman entities like trees or rivers could follow a similar trajectory. However, Stone acknowledges that this would require a fundamental transformation in societal values - a leap from viewing nature as a resource to recognising it as a stakeholder with intrinsic worth.
To make his case, Stone sets out three criteria for granting standing to nonhuman entities:
The lawsuit must be filed in the entity’s name.
Damages must be assessed in terms of harm to the entity itself.
Any remedies must directly benefit the nonhuman entity.
This framework is illustrated through the 1972 Sierra Club v. Morton case, in which the U.S. Supreme Court denied standing to the Sierra Club to challenge Walt Disney’s planned development in the Sierra Nevada. Stone posits that had the valley itself, Mineral King, been recognised as an aggrieved party, the Sierra Club could have acted as its guardian, potentially changing the case’s outcome. Although the Sierra Club lost, Stone’s ideas influenced Justice William O. Douglas’s dissent, signaling the broader impact of his thesis.
Expanding the Scope: Stewardship and Global Guardianship
Stone extends his argument to a wide range of environmental issues, from sustainable agriculture to the governance of global commons like oceans and the atmosphere. He proposes a "Global Guardianship" model, in which human representatives would advocate for the rights of nonhuman entities in legal and policy arenas. This approach, Stone argues, could better address the transboundary nature of environmental harm and the interconnectedness of ecosystems.
However, Stone’s focus on common law limits the applicability of his ideas to jurisdictions governed by civil law, where codification rather than judicial precedent holds sway. Civil law systems, prevalent in much of Europe and Latin America, might struggle to integrate Stone’s guardianship model without significant legal reforms. Moreover, while Stone emphasises the judiciary’s potential role in creating ecologically centred precedents, he underestimates the complementary power of international soft law instruments - such as UN agreements or climate pledges - in shaping global environmental standards.
Challenges and Contradictions
Stone’s vision, while ambitious, is not without challenges. Critics might question whether granting legal rights to nature would necessarily lead to greater protection. For instance, Stone’s proposal for trust funds to manage damages could inadvertently expose ecosystems to financial liabilities, particularly in cases involving invasive species or natural disasters exacerbated by climate change. Additionally, his model relies heavily on human-appointed guardians, raising concerns about whose interests would ultimately be represented.
Perhaps the most profound challenge lies in reconciling Stone’s critique of anthropocentrism with the inherently human-centric nature of law. Even if legal systems could recognise nature as a rights-bearing entity, the determination of its "will" would remain subject to human interpretation, potentially perpetuating the very assumptions Stone seeks to dismantle. This paradox underscores the difficulty of envisioning a truly ecocentric legal order within a system created by and for humans.
Conclusion
Despite its limitations, Stone’s thesis is a landmark contribution to environmental legal thought. It challenges foundational assumptions about the relationship between law and nature and provides a framework for imagining a more inclusive legal system. While the book might have benefited from deeper engagement with the practicalities of implementing its ideas - particularly in civil law systems or through international mechanisms - it remains a vital resource for legal scholars and environmental advocates grappling with the inadequacies of current frameworks in addressing the climate crisis. Stone’s call to expand legal personhood to nature is as provocative as it is urgent, offering a bold vision for rethinking the role of law in the Anthropocene.
